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Cruel But Not So Unusual:
Farmer v. Brennan
and the Devolving Standards of Decency
I. INTRODUCTION
Christopher Scarver attacked him while he was cleaning a prison
gymnasium bathroom, smashing his head with a metal bar borrowed
from an exercise machine.! When Scarver beat his infamous fellow
inmate Jeffrey Dahmer to death, many felt that justice had been
served.2 However, other victims of this type of assault have not been
convicted of murdering young boys and eating their remains. Dee Farm-
er was convicted merely of credit card fraud, yet he suffered a brutal
attack at the hands of a fellow inmate.3 When he refused an inmate's
demand for sexual intercourse, the inmate punched and kicked Farm-
er.4 After threatening Farmer with a homemade knife, the attacker
ripped off Farmer's clothes and raped him. The attacker threatened to
murder Farmer if he reported the incident.6 Attacks of this nature are
all too frequent an occurrence at prisons across this country.7 Prison
inmates are the forgotten members of society, overlooked by most peo-
ple as they go about their daily lives.' However, when a prisoner as
1. Edward Walsh, Serial Killer Dahmer Slain at Prison Job, WASH. PosT, Nov.
29, 1994, at Al; Dahmer's Accused Killer Has Violent Past, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1995,
at A4.
2. In 1991, Dahmer confessed that since 1978 he had murdered 17 young men
and boys. Walsh, supra note 1, at A6. Id. Dahmer reportedly dismembered his vic-
tims, preserved various body parts in formaldehyde or in his freezer, and ate some
portions of the bodies. Id.
3. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974-75 (1994).
4. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Farmer (No. 92-7247).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See James E. Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection
from Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 101, 104-05 (1985), for a discussion of the
frequency of assaults, homicides, and rapes in prison. Additionally, see David M.
Siegal, Note, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment
Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L Rav. 1541, 1544-45 (1992), for a specific
look at the prevalence of homosexual rape among male prisoners and the potential
spread of AIDS among this population.
8. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
infamous as Jeffrey Dahmer is murdered, the outside world is presented
with a view of the atrocities that occur regularly in prison.'
As a civilized society, this is not something that we can ignore. Yet, it
is becoming easier to do just that. With its decision in Farmer v.
Brennan, the United States Supreme Court indicated that it will tolerate
these incidents if prison officials lacked actual knowledge that such
attacks would occur.'0 The Court stated that only subjective knowledge
constitutes the deliberate indifference necessary to violate the Eighth
Amendment." The Court sought in Farmer to clarify this standard due
to the lower courts' fumbling searches for the appropriate definition.12
Whether it succeeded remains to be seen.
This Note discusses the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
in Part II, focusing specifically on the development of the deliberate
indifference standard. 3 Part III outlines the facts and procedural histo-
ry of Farmer.4 Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's opinion and its
rationale behind the definition and application of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard.'" Part V explores the impact of the Court's decision on
the judiciary and courts' future application of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard, as well as the effects on prisoners' rights.9 Part VI con-
cludes that after Farmer, courts still lack an exact definition of deliber-
ate indifference. Further, a prisoner's right to be free of cruel and un-
usual conditions of confinement appears to be in jeopardy.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment protects the rights of those incarcerated for
committing a crime.'7 It guarantees that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
("Prisoners are persons whom most of us would rather not think about. Banished
from everyday sight, they exist in a shadow world that only dimly enters our
awareness.").
9. See infra note 148.
10. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974 (1994); see infra notes 111-22 and
accompanying text.
11. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1974.
12. See iomra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 17-95 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 111-72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 173-206 and accompanying text.
17. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause becomes applicable only after con-
viction. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986). For a discussion of prisoners'
remedies for Eighth Amendment violations, see Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates'
Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLuM. L REv. 1475, 1499-1502 (1986).
For a discussion of the actions a prisoner may bring to seek relief for alleged Eighth
Amendment violations, see generally Maureen A. Dowd, Note, A Comparison of Sec-
tion 1983 and Federal Habeas Corpus in State Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NORE DAME
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required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."" The Supreme Court originally interpreted and ap-
plied the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions to those punishments in-
volving torturous and barbarous treatment." In Wilkerson v. Utah,"
L REV. 1315 (1984).
A prisoner may bring an action directly under the auspices of the Eighth
Amendment or under § 1983 of the United States Code. Section 1983 states:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with-
in the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
A prisoner may also bring a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, federal agents violated the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights by committing an illegal search and seizure of his property. Id. at
389. The federal agents argued that Webster Bivens's suit for money damages be dis-
missed because recovery of money damages for a constitutional infringement is an ac-
tion in tort that should be decided in a state court under state law. Id. at 390-91. In
rejecting the respondents' claim, the Supreme Court established that where a federal
official or agent violates an individual's constitutional rights, federal courts have the
power to provide that person a remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages.
Id. at 396-97. This is true whether or not the state court with the appropriate juris-
diction has conferred such a cause of action. Id. at 392.
The Court reaffirmed its position in Bivens in Carlson v. Green. 446 U.S. 14, 18
(1980). Carlson addressed an Eighth Amendment claim for failure of prison officials to
provide adequate medical care to an inmate. Id. at 16 n.1. The Court in Carlson recog-
nized that "Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal
agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the
absence of any statute conferring such a right." Id. at 18. Based on Bivens, the Court
upheld the action for recovery of money damages despite the fact that the inmate's es-
tate could also have brought a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FrCA). Id. at
19. The Court stated that Congress intended FrCA to be a "counterpart" to Bivens. Id.
at 20 (quoting S. Rep. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
2789, 2791).
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
19. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted". The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL L REV. 839, 842 (1969); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a
Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN.
L REV. 838, 840 (1972). For a look at Supreme Court accounts of the Eighth
Amendment's history, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686-96 (1991);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); and Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 352-57 (1910).
20. 99 U.S. 130 (1898).
the Court stated that, while an exact definition of cruel and unusual
punishment would be difficult to provide, "it is safe to affirm that pun-
ishments of torture,... and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth Ajmendment to the Constitu-
tion."2 The Court again noted in In re Kemmler that "[plunishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death." '
With its decision in Weems v. United States,' the Court made the
Eighth Amendment applicable to punishments disproportionate to the
crime committed.2 In reviewing a sentence of fifteen years at hard la-
bor for the crime of falsifying a "public and official document," the
Court expanded its view of the Eighth Amendment and found that a
sentence of this nature for such a crime is "repugnant" to the
Constitution.25 The majority explained that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete
[forms of punishment it originally sought to abolish] but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."'
After Weems, the Court further expanded the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to include punishments "incompatible with 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,'"27 such as those that are excessive because they either "in-
volve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or are "grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime."' The original focus of
21. Id. at 136.
22. 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). In deciding that the death penalty was not cruel and
unusual punishment, the Court stated that the Eighth Amendment requires "something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Id.
As examples of what type of punishment would be cruel and unusual, the Court
listed punishments such as burning at the stake and crucifixion. Id. at 446.
23. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
24. Id. at 379.
25. Id. at 378-82. The Court found that "[t]here are degrees of homicide that are
not punished so severely" as the crime of falsifying public documents. Id. at 380.
26. Id. at 378.
27. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). The petitioner in Trop received the punishment of
denationalization for desertion during wartime. 356 U.S. at 99. Since death was the
alternative penalty and denationalization was less severe, the Court could not find
this punishment unconstitutional under the theory that it was excessive for the crime.
Id. Instead, the Court rejected a rigid interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and
determined that "the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. The Court con-
sidered the punishments that other nations provided for desertion and found few
employed as severe a penalty as denationalization. Id. at 102. Thus, through compara-
tive analysis of other nations' penalties, the Court found denationalization cruel and
unusual. Id,
28. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). For a complete discussion of the
[Vol. 23: 175, 1995] Farmer v. Brennan
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these interpretations was the length of the sentence or the nature of the
punishment handed down by judge or jury.' The Court declared -pun-
ishments unconstitutional if they were objectively severe or exces-
sive.'
In the early 1960s, courts developed a hands-off doctrine regarding
prison issues. Allegations of inhumane confinement conditions were left
to legislators.3 Courts explained this deference to the legislatures in
various ways. For example, the Tenth Circuit held that "[clourts are
without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere with
the ordinary prison rules or regulations."' Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
stated that "courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of
principle of proportionality, see Scott K Petersen, Note, The Punishment Need Not
Fit the Crime: Harmelin v. Michigan and The Eighth Amendment, 20 PFPP. L REV.
747 (1993). For additional information on this subject, see Nancy Keir, Note, Solem v.
Helm: Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
to Require "Proportionality" of Prison Sentences, 33 CATH. U. L REv. 479 (1984), and
Daryl P. Rush, Note, Constitutional Law-Safeguarding Eighth Amendment. Rights
With a Comparative Proportionality Review in the Imposition of the Death Penalty:
Pulley v. Harris, 28 How. LJ. 331 (1985).
29. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
30. See id. In Weems, the Court compared the petitioner's punishment with sen-
tences mandated by statute for violent crimes and determined, without any subjective
intent analysis, that the petitioner's sentence was cruel and unusual. See Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380-81 (1910).
31. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175. "The deference we owe to the decisions of the state
legislatures under our federal system ... is enhanced where the specification of pun-
ishments is concerned, for 'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.'" Id. at
176 (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)). The petitioner in Gore
asked the Court to review a penalty received under a federal statute for selling illicit
drugs. 357 U.S. at 387. The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of his sentence
under a federal statute that allowed him to be convicted for three individual offenses
arising out of a single narcotics transaction. Id. The trial court issued separate sen-
tences to run consecutively for each of the three offenses. Id. at 388. The petitioner
asked the Court to vacate the sentence, arguing that the trial court could only im-
pose one sentence for the one transaction that occurred. Id. In holding that the sen-
tence was constitutional, the Court studied the legislative intent and explained that
Congress intended to punish each aspect of the transaction separately; its purpose
was to be severe. Id. at 390. The Court resolved that it had no power to "enter the
domain of penology, and... the proper apportionment of punishment,]" because
questions about the severity of a sentence are to be left to legislators. Id. at 393.
32. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859
(1954); see also Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (stating
that the "internal affairs of prisons, including the discipline, treatment, and care of
prisoners are ordinarily the responsibility of the prison administrators and not subject
to judicial review").
the various institutions provided by law for the confinement of federal
prisoners. "'
A. Introduction of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,4 the Supreme Court
paved the way for the intent requirement in Eighth Amendment analy-
sis. The petitioner in Resweber questioned the constitutionality of a
planned second attempt to execute him after the first attempt at his
electrocution failed.' The Court held that a second attempt would not
violate the petitioner's rights.'
In addressing the petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim, the Court
stated that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits cruelty
that is "inherent in the method of punishment," not the suffering that is
a necessary by-product of the type of punishment the judge or jury has
handed down. 7 The Court explained, "The fact that an unforeseeable
accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence can-
not.... add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There is
no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain in-
volved in the proposed [second attempt at] execution."' The Court's
reliance on the fact that prison officials had no intent to produce any
added mental or physical anguish allowed for the Court's future inclu-
sion of a mental element on the part of prison officials.'
In its landmark case, Estelle v. Gamble, the Court partially relied on
the reasoning in Resweber ° In Estelle, the Court, for the first time,
required deliberate indifference in assessing cruel and unusual punish-
ment claims. In so doing, the Court backed away from its prior hands-
33. Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951).
34. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
35. Id at 460-61. The first attempt.at electrocution proceeded to the point of ac-
tually throwing the switch. Id, at 460. However, there were mechanical problems and
although electrical current passed through the prisoner's body, the current did not kill
him. Id. Officials returned the inmate to the prison and procured a new death war-
rant Id, at 460-61. The prisoner contended that a second attempt would violate both
the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision and the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id, at 461.
36. Id. at 463-64.
37. Id. at 464.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court relied on the plurality's reasoning in Resweber
that a mere accident could not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). See also Justice Stevens' dissent in Estelle, recognizing that
the Court's rationale in Resweber created a subjective intent requirement. Id, at 116
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 106.
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off doctrine and recognized that certain conditions of confinement may
be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.4
The plaintiff in EsteUe based his claim on the inadequacy of his medi-
cal treatment in prison for a back injury that occurred there.42 Writing
for the majority, Justice Marshall reasoned that, since inmates are de-
prived of liberty and cannot provide for their own medical care, the
government must accommodate this need.' However, mere medical
malpractice alone does not establish a constitutional violation." Only
where prison doctors or prison guards exhibit deliberate indifference to
an inmate's medical needs will an inmate have a valid Eighth Amend-
ment claim." Justice Marshall stated that "a prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indiffer-
ence .... It is only such indifference that can offend evolving stan-
dards of decency in violation of the Eighth Amendment."' The Court
acknowledged Resweber's holding that an isolated accident or ordinary
negligence does not constitute the "wanton infliction of unnecessary
pain" barred by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."' The
41. Id. at 104-05.
42. Id. at 98. Inmate Gamble's injury arose during a work assignment when a 600-
pound bale of cotton fell on him. Id. at 99. Prison doctors provided ineffective treat-
ment and misdiagnosed his problems repeatedly. Id. at 100-01. Gamble filed suit un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the director of the Texas Department of Corrections,
the prison warden, and the prison's medical director as defendants. Id. at 98. See
supra note 17 for a discussion of § 1983.
43. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. The Court again recognized this duty to provide proper
medical care to inmates in its decision in Youngberg v. Romeo. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that when a person is within the cus-
tody of the state, the state has "a duty to provide certain services and care ....
Id. at 317. Likewise, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., the
Court explained that the state has a duty "to assume some responsibility for [a
prisoner's] ... safety and well-being" when it deprives this individual of his ability to
provide for himself. 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
44. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
45. Id. at 104. For a detailed look at prisoners' rights concerning medical care, see
Michael C. Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L REV. 921
(1992).
46. Estele, 429 U.S. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court recog-
nized that prison officials may exhibit deliberate indifference either in their "response
to the prisoner's needs or by ... intentionally denying or delaying access to medical
care." Id. at 104-05. Additionally, a prison guard will be liable if he "intentionally
interferes" with an inmate's prescribed treatment Id. at 105.
47. Id.
Court's opinion, however, was incomplete, because the majority failed
to set forth what a prisoner must show to evidence a prison official's
deliberate indifference.' I
B. Scrutinizing Conditions of Confinement
Two years after EsteUe, the Court expressly recognized that the con-
ditions of confinement, being an essential consideration in evaluating
the punishment one receives, are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. ' In Hutto v.
Finney, the Court mentioned that the conditions of Arkansas isolation
cells, occupied by prisoners for indeterminate periods of time, were
unconstitutional.' The majority proclaimed that "[c]onfinement in a
prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny
under Eighth Amendment standards."' However, the Court went no
further in its analysis because there was no dispute that the conditions
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.52 The petitioners did not
challenge the district court's conclusion that prison conditions may
render one's punishment cruel and unusual.' They merely challenged
the district court's order that barred prison officials from placing an
inmate in punitive isolation for greater than thirty days.' Because it
48. Justice Stevens's dissent addressed the ambiguity of the majority opinion. He
asserted that the majority incorrectly attributed a subjective component to the Eighth
Amendment analysis where the Constitution does not require one. Id. at 108-09
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that whether there is an Eighth
Amendment violation should be based on an objective assessment of the punishment
itself, not the subjective "motivation of the individual who inflicted it." Id. at 116
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Quoting Resweber's dissent, Justice Stevens explained that
the "'intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or excuse the result.'" Id. at
116 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Louisiana ex rte. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 477 (1947) (Burton, J., dissenting)).
49. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
50. Id. at 687. The district court characterized the prison as "'a dark and evil
world completely alien to the free world.'" Id. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). The conditions prisoners regularly faced included
physical brutality at the hands of fellow prisoners, rape, and 10-hour workdays in
temperatures just above freezing, sometimes working in lightweight clothing and with-
out shoes. Id. at 682 n.3. Conditions in isolation cells were deplorable. The cells on
occasion housed up to 11 prisoners in only an eight-by-ten-foot space. Id. at 682.
Their only luxury was a water source and a toilet that guards flushed from the out-
side. Id. Prisoners slept on mattresses that prison guards piled together each day
without regard for the spread of infectious diseases. Id. at 682-83.
51. Id. at 685.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The petitioner erroneously assumed that the district court's order prohibited
any indeterminate sentence of isolation as unconstitutional. Id. The Court reiterated
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did not have to examine the conditions in question, the Court did not
take the opportunity to explain how it would have applied the deliber-
ate indifference standard set forth in Estelle to such conditions.
In Rhodes v. Chapman,' the Court finally received a clear opportu-
nity to specifically address when the conditions of one's confinement
will constitute cruel and unusual punishment.' The petitioners in
Rhodes challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio prison's practice of
double-ceiling.67 In holding that this condition did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court stated that there is no "static test"
applicable to a court's assessment of the conditions of confinement.'
The Court must look to society and its "'evolving standards of decen-
cy. 9"9 The Court further expounded that "conditions that cannot be
said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not
unconstitutional. " ' More importantly, the Court recognized a judicial
responsibility to scrutinize the conditions of confinement to protect the
rights of a prisoner who brings a constitutional claim based on such
the district court's determination that the conditions of and length of isolation are
both factors to be considered. Id. at 685-86.
55. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
56. In prior cases, as in Hutto, the Court had no opportunity to address whether
specific conditions constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Hutto, the prison officials conceded that prison condi-
tions were unconstitutional. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Likewise,
in Ingraham, the Court could not expand on the standard's application. See id. at
653. The Court addressed the constitutionality of corporal punishment in a public
school. Id. While this issue did not justify ascertaining an applicable standard for
conditions of confinement, the Court did opine that "[pirison brutality . . . is 'part of
the total punishment to which the individual is being subjected for his crime and, as
such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment scrutiny.'" Id. at 669 (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
57. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339-40. "Double-celling" is housing two individuals together
in the same cell. Id. Prisoners alleged that double-ceiling led two inmates to be con-
fined too closely together in space intended for only one inmate. Id. at 340. This
contributed to overcrowding, which "overwhelmed" the prison's staff. Id.
58. Id. at 346.
59. Id. The Court relied on the oft-quoted text of Trop v. Dulies: "The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
ress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
60. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
conditions.6' The Court erred, however, in neglecting to address the
deliberate indifference requirement set forth in Estelle.'
In Whitley v. Albers,' the Court had the opportunity to address yet
another aspect of conditions of confinement. In Whitley, an inmate
challenged prison officials' use of force to end a cellblock riot.' The
Court held that only a showing that prison officials used force "mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" will es-
tablish a valid constitutional claim.' The Court distinguished this case
from Estelle by explaining the urgency with which decisions are often
made in maintaining prison security.' The Court stressed that there
are conflicting interests that prison officials must take into consider-
ation when attempting to quiet a disturbance within a prison.67 The
safety of prison officials and other inmates must be balanced against
possible harm to violent or rioting prisoners.' The majority found the
deliberate indifference standard set forth in EsteUe inapplicable in this
context because prison officials' duty to provide adequate medical treat-
ment to inmates does not involve a conflict between competing govern-
mental responsibilities like those presented in a use-of-force case.'
61. Id. at 352. Justice Brennan's concurrence goes even further than the majority
opinion. Justice Brennan stated that, because of the political powerlessness of prison
inmates, courts are emerging as the "critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhu-
mane conditions." Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, courts should be in
the forefront in demanding remedial measures for unconstitutional conditions, even if
the financial expense of raising the conditions to a constitutional level would be
significant. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. Unlike Hutto, where the Court touched on deliberate indifference even though
the facts of the case did not justify a thorough analysis, the Court did not broach
the issue in Rhodes.
63. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
64. Id, at 315-17. A riot broke out in the Oregon State Penitentiary, and an inmate
held a prison officer hostage and threatened the officer's life. Id. at 314-15. Prison
officials determined that the safest way to deal with the situation, both with regard
to the hostage and other prisoners, was to take an armed assault team into the cell
block. Id. at 315-16. Whitley, the prison security manager, ordered the assault team to
provide coverage for him as he ascended a stairway in the cell block to negotiate
the release of the hostage. Id, at 316. Whitley's instructions were to fire a warning
shot, then aim low at any prisoner who attempted to ascend the stairs behind him.
Id. A prison guard shot inmate Albers in the knee when he followed Whitley up the
stairs. Id.
65. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
66. Id, at 320. The Court noted that officials often make such decisions "under
pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id,
69. Id,
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C. Applying the Deliberate Indifference Standard to Conditions of
Confinement
Until 1991, the Court had yet to specifically apply the deliberate indif-
ference standard to cases where a prisoner alleges that the conditions
of his confinement are unconstitutional. The Court changed course with
its decision in Wilson v. Seiter. The plaintiff in Wilson brought a
§ 1983 claim," alleging that the combined effect of conditions in an
Ohio prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.' The issue that reached the Supreme Court
was whether a prisoner claiming unconstitutionality due to prison con-
ditions must show that the prison officials had a culpable state of
mind.' The Court answered in the affirmative by holding that the de-
liberate indifference standard necessary in adequacy of medical care
cases under Estelle is applicable to conditions of confinement cases.74
The Court stated that it saw no difference between those cases involv-
ing inadequate medical care and those involving the character of the
physical conditions of the facility."5
70. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of Wilson, see Russell
W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter. Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direc-
tion for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L REV. 1339 (1992).
See also Diana L Davis, Comment, Deliberate Indifference: An "Unnecessary"
Change?, 29 Hous. L REV. 923, 935-44 (1992), for an analysis of Wilson and the de-
liberate indifference standard.
71. See supra note 17.
72. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323. Inmate Wilson alleged that the combined effect of
overcrowding, insufficient space, inadequate temperature control and ventilation, noise,
and unsanitary restrooms and dining facilities, among other things, created cruel and
unusual conditions of confinement. Id. Wilson requested not only declaratory and in-
junctive relief, but also sought to obtain compensatory and punitive damages in the
amount of $900,000. Id.
73. Id. at 2326.
74. Id. at 2327. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, quoted a Fourth Circuit opin-
ion: "'Whether one characterizes the treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane
conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of
both, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference standard articulated in
Estelle.'" Id. (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987)). The court
in LaFaut concluded that prison officials' failure to meet a paraplegic inmate's spe-
cial physical needs, including adequate facilities and physical therapy, amounted to an
Eighth Amendment violation. LaFaut, 834 F.2d at 394. The court declared that prison
officials "should not ignore the basic needs of a handicapped individual or postpone
addressing those needs out of mere convenience or apathy." Id.
75. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
The Court outlined two components that a prisoner must allege to
have a valid Eighth Amendment claim."6 First, the deprivation must
objectively be sufficiently serious to deprive the prisoner of the minimal
necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment,
and reasonable safety.77 As a second component, where the pain in-
flicted is not a formal part of the punishment set forth by statute or by
the sentencing judge, the inmate must be able to show the inflicting
officer acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind."78 In consider-
ing what state of mind applies in challenges to the conditions of con-
finement, the parties agreed that the "malicious and sadistic" standard
set forth in Whit/ey was inappropriate.7' The Court found the delib-
erate indifference standard applicable by characterizing prison medical
treatment as a condition of confinement with virtually no material dif-
ference from the food, clothing, and protection a prison also pro-
vides.' Based on this rationale, the Court extended the deliberate in-
difference standard to all conditions of confinement cases.8' However,
the Court again neglected to define deliberate indifference.'
In its 1993 term, the Court added an important element to the Eighth
Amendment analysis applicable to conditions of confinement. In HeUing
v. McKinney,' inmate McKinney challenged the constitutionality of
prison conditions in a Nevada State prison by alleging that involuntary
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) was cruel and unusual
punishment because it unreasonably threatened his health.' Prison
officials sought review by the Supreme Court alleging that where an
inmate is not currently suffering health problems, he does not have a
valid constitutional claim.' The officials asked the Court to hold that
the Eighth Amendment only applies to those prison conditions that
76. Id. at 2324.
77. Id. at 2324-26.
78. Id. at 2324.
79. Id. at 2326; see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing Whtley
and the Court's analysis of prison security as a condition of confinement).
80. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
81. Id. at 2327.
82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
83. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
84. Id. at 2478. McKinney shared a cell with an inmate who smoked five packs of
cigarettes per day. Id. The magistrate deciding the case held that McKinney had pre-
sented no evidence establishing that he either had current medical problems due to
the exposure to ETS or that prison officials exhibited any deliberate indifference to
them. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the magistrate's ruling that McKinney had no
constitutional right to be free from cigarette smoke. Id. at 2478-79. However, the
Supreme Court held that McKinney had a valid Eighth Amendment claim and should
be permitted to prove the unreasonable risk such exposure caused. Id.
85. Id. at 2480.
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create a current medical problem.' In rejecting this claim, the Court
relied on the Eighth Amendment's requirement that prison officials
must provide inmates with basic needs, including "reasonable safety."17
Reasonable safety includes freedom from an unsafe environment,
whether the risk be from infectious disease, unsuitable drinking water,
or, as here, the effects of environmental tobacco smoke.' TheCourt
declared that a prisoner "need not await a tragic event" before being
entitled to relief.' The Court further noted that, if McKinney could
provide proof to establish that (1) an unreasonable risk of harm exists,
(2) the exposure to ETS is one which "society considers .. to be so
grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk," and (3) prison officials manifest
deliberate indifference to this situation, he would be entitled to relief
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.'
Yet, once again the Court failed to provide a definition of deliberate
indifference. The problems created by this omission become evident
when one reviews lower court cases attempting to apply this standard.
For example, the Tenth Circuit applies a subjective standard requiring a
showing of "actual knowledge of impending harm" to the prisoner on
the part of the accused prison officials." However, other circuits allow
knowledge to be imputed in establishing deliberate indifference. The
Third' and Ninth' Circuits apply a "known or should have known"
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2480-81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2482. For a more thorough treatment of Helting, see Jacqueline M. Kane,
Note, You've Come a Long Way, Felon" Helling v. McKinney Extends the Eighth
Amendment to Grant Prisoners the Exclusive Constitutional Right to a Smoke-Free
Environment, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1399 (1994).
91. McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
907 (1992); see also Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating offi-
cial must show actual knowledge). For a thorough account of McGill v. Duckworth
and the Seventh Circuit's application of the criminal recklessness standard, see Scott
Rauser, Comment, Prisons Are Dangerous Places: Criminal Recklessness as the
Eighth Amendment Standard of Liability in McGill v. Duckworth, 78 MIN. L REv.
165 (1993).
92. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a "prison
official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should have known of a suffi-
ciently serious danger to an inmate").
93. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991), cert., de-
nied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992); see also Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d
standard. Farmer v. Brennan' provided the Court with the opportuni-
ty to ultimately define the "deliberate indifference" requirement in a suit
against prison officials for harm suffered by an inmate stemming from
the conditions of his confinement."
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1986, Dee Farmer was convicted of credit card fraud and was
sentenced to the Federal Correctional Institute in Oxford (FCI-Oxford),
Wisconsin.' At the time of his conviction, Farmer was a preoperative
transsexual who, although biologically male, had undergone breast
implantation surgery and estrogen therapy and had unsuccessfully at-
tempted black market surgery to remove his testicles. 7 He wore
women's clothing prior to and throughout his trial.' Additionally,
Farmer claimed to have continued hormone therapy during his incarcer-
ation via drugs that were smuggled into prison.'
In March 1989, prison officials transferred Farmer to the United
States Penitentiary in Terre Haute (USP-Terre Haute), Indiana, which is
a higher security prison that typically houses "more troublesome prison-
ers. " "°° Two weeks following the transfer, another prisoner raped and
beat Farmer in Farmer's own cell.' ' In response to this incident,
Farmer filed a Bivensl° complaint challenging the constitutionality of
the prison conditions, which he claimed facilitated the brutal inci-
dent."i Farmer maintained that prison officials violated the Eighth
556, 560 (lst Cir.) (applying the "known or should have known" standard), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (applying the "known or should have known" standard). For a detailed
account of the split among circuit courts, see generally Rauser, supra note 91.
94. 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974 (1994).
95. Id.
96. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974-75 (1994).
97. Id. at 1975. A transsexual is "one who has 'a rare psychiatric disorder in
which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and
who typically seeks medical treatment... to bring about a permanent sex change."
Id. (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)).
98. Id.
99. Id. Due to federal procedures of imprisoning preoperative transsexuals with
inmates of the same biological sex, prison officials placed Farmer in a male prison
despite his feminine appearance. Id. On occasion, prison officials segregated Farmer
from the general prison population for disciplinary reasons. Id. However, at least one
period of segregation was a precautionary measure to protect his safety. Id.
100. Id. Prison officials transferred Farmer for various disciplinary violations, includ-
ing credit card fraud and purchasing items over the telephone. Brief of Respondents
at 3, Farmer (No. 92-7247).
101. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975; see supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 17 (discussing Bivens).
103. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975. Farmer sued the warden of USP-Terre Haute and
[Vol. 23: 175, 1995] Farmer v. Brennan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Amendment with deliberate indifference to his safety when they trans-
ferred him to a violent general prison population, despite knowing that
his transsexual status and the facility's history of inmate violence would
make him susceptible to a sexual attack.' In addition to compensato-
ry and punitive damages, Farmer asked the court to bar his further con-
finement in any penitentiary."
The district court granted summary judgement in favor of the prison
officials."n The court held that the prison officials were not deliberate-
ly indifferent because they lacked the criminal recklessness required for
an Eighth Amendment violation.'°7 The court reasoned that the defen-
dants lacked the actual knowledge of a threat of harm required under
the criminal recklessness standard.l" On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision without opin-
ion." Because various courts of appeals defined the term differently,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to define and ex-
plain the term "deliberate indifference.""'
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons in their official capacities. Id. He also sued the
warden of FCI-Oxford, a case manager at FCI-Oxford, and an official and the director
of the Bureau of Prisons North Central Region Office in their official capacities. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1975-76.
106. Id. at 1976. Farmer had filed a motion for summary judgment in response to
the prison officials' motion for the same. Id. Farmer also requested, pursuant to Rule
56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the district court refuse to rule on
the prison officials' motion until the officials complied with Farmer's discovery re-
quests. Id. The district court, in granting summary judgment, denied the 56(f) motion.
Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see supra note 91. The district court found no actual knowledge based on
the fact that Farmer had not voiced "any concern for his safety." Farmer, 114 S. Ct.
at 1976.
109. Farmer, 114 S. CL at 1976.
110. Id.; see supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
Justice Souter asserted that only a prison official's subjective aware-
ness of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate constitutes a valid
Eighth Amendment claim."' He explained that although the Court nev-
er explicitly defined "deliberate indifference," its previous decisions pro-
vide the necessary guidance."2
Justice Souter noted that Estelle v. Gamble"' made it clear that de-
liberate indifference connotes something more than mere negligence,
while Hudson v. McMillian"'4 points to something less than intent to
cause harm."' He observed that the circuit courts have found middle
111. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice
Souter's opinion. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas each filed separate concur-
ring opinions. Id. at 1986-91; see infra notes 140-72 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing concurring opinions).
112. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1977-78. Justice Souter traced the developmental history
of the deliberate indifference standard under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Id. at 1976-78. Justice Souter also stated that the Court has previously as-
sumed that "'[prison officials have a duty... to protect prisoners from violence at
the hands of other prisoners.'" Id. (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842
F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988)).
113. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
114. 112 S. Ct 995 (1992).
115. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. 1978; see supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion of EsteUe.
In Hudson, a prisoner brought an Eighth Amendment Claim after an episode in
which a corrections officer used unnecessary force and caused the inmate to develop
bruises, facial swelling, and loosened teeth. 112 S. Ct. at 997, 1000. The guard
handcuffed and shackled inmate Hudson before escorting him to another area of the
prison. Id. at 997-98. As they were proceeding down the hallway, the guard punched
Hudson "in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach" while other guards simply stood by
and watched. Id.
A magistrate judge found for Hudson. Id. at 998. However, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that there is no constitutional violation where
the inmate has not suffered serious injury. Id. The Supreme Court found that the
Fifth Circuit had erred. Id. at 1000. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated
that, when "prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, con-
temporary standards of decency always are violated[,]" whether or not the injury is
only minor. Id.
The Court distinguished conditions of confinement cases from excessive force
claims. Id. at 1000-01. In conditions of confinement cases, a serious deprivation is
required, because prison officials only have a duty to provide basic needs, not a
comfortable environment. Id.
For an in-depth discussion of Hudson, see John J. Phillips, Note, Jailhouse
Shock, Hudson v. McMillian and the Supreme Court's Flawed Interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, 26 CONN. L REv. 355 (1993), and Doretha M. Van Slyke, Note,
[Vol. 23: 175, 1995] Farmer v. Brennan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ground between these two extremes by applying a recklessness stan-
dard."6 However, the Court rejected Farmer's proposed civil
recklessness approach and held that "a prison official cannot be found
liable ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
[of harm] to inmate health or safety.""7 Justice Souter explained that
the prison "official must both be aware of facts from which the infer-
ence could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.""' In reaching this conclusion, Jus-
tice Souter pointed to the two-part test set forth in Wilson v. Seiter."'
Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners' Rights: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh
Away, 42 Am. U. L REV. 1727 (1993).
116. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978; see, e.g., La Marca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535
(11th Cir. 1993) ("To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must knowingly or
recklessly disregard an inmate's basic needs . .. ."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189
(1994); Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 957 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating reck-
less behavior on the part of a police official amounts to deliberate indifference), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 113 (1992); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443
(9th Cir. 1991) (stating that officials have a duty "not to act with reckless indiffer-
ence"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992).
117. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1979. Farmer urged the Court to follow the definition of
deliberate indifference set forth in City of Canton v. Harris. Id. at 1980; see City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). In his brief, Farmer stated that Canton "simpli-
fied" the Court's task of defining deliberate indifference because the Canton Court
held that municipalities are liable for obvious risks, which officials should know
about and that are likely to pose a threat to an individual's constitutional rights.
Brief of Petitioner at 19-21, Farmer (No. 92-7247). Farmer explained that the Canton
"should have known" standard meets the Wilson minimal state of mind requirement,
while the "actual knowledge" requirement urged by the respondents too closely re-
sembles the "malicious and sadistic" standard, which is preserved for use of force
cases. Id.
In Canton, the respondent brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that the police department violated her constitutional rights when it failed to provide
her with adequate "medical attention while in police custody." Canton, 489 U.S. at
381. During the time that police held her, Mrs. Harris had "slumped to the floor on
two occasions," but police personnel failed to provide her with medical assistance.
Id. An hour later, police released her from custody, and her family transported her
to a hospital where she was diagnosed with "several emotional ailments." Id. The
Court held that the city would only be liable for failing to train police personnel to
spot special medical circumstances, which are beyond simple first-aid assistance, upon
a showing of "deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants."
Id. at 392. The Court stated that the need for further training may be "so obvi-
ous ... that the policymakers of the city [could] . . . reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need." Id. at 390.
118. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1979.
119. 501 U.S. 294 (1991); see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
In Wilson, the Court specifically rejected imposing liability under the
Eighth Amendment based on a purely objective test regarding the con-
ditions of confinement.'20 Justice Souter stated that a subjective com-
ponent recognizes that the Eighth Amendment outlaws only cruel and
unusual punishments and thus applies solely to those who actually
inflict punishment. 2 ' Finally, Justice Souter asserted that without
knowledge of a risk of harm to an inmate, any act or omission com-
mitted by a prison official cannot be considered an infliction of punish-
ment. "=
The Court added that under this definition a prisoner may prove a
prison official's subjective knowledge through the presentation of cir-
cumstantial evidence, including the fact that the risk was obvious to a
reasonable person."n Justice Souter stated that, if an inmate can pres-
ent evidence that a risk was "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented,
or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances
suggest that the defendant-official... had been exposed to" this infor-
mation, the inmate may use this evidence as proof that the official must
have known of the risk.24 A jury may then properly find that the pris-
on official had actual knowledge." Justice Souter added that a prison
official who has actual knowledge of a substantial risk will likewise not
escape liability by showing that he did not know which particular in-
mate would be assaulted or which particular inmate would commit the
assault.'
The Court quickly cautioned, however, that while knowledge may be
shown by evidence that the risk was so pervasive as to be obvious, "it
is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person would have
known, or that the defendant should have known."' 7 The jury cannot
be compelled to find knowledge under these circumstances and should
receive an instruction to that effect." Also, prison officials may dem-
onstrate that, although the risk seemed obvious, they were truly un-
aware of any danger posed to an inmate's safety.'" Moreover, Justice
120. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1980.
121. Id.
122. Id, at 1979.
123. Id. at 1981.
124. Id. at 1981-82 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 22, Farmer (No. 92-7247)).
125. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondents at 22, Farmer (No. 92-7247)).
126. Id, at 1982. Justice Souter stated that it is "irrelevant to liability that the offi-
cials could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom." Id.
127. Id, at 1982 n.8.
128. Id at 1982.
129. Id A prison official who merely refuses to verify or confirm his suspicions re-
garding an inmate's safety does not escape liability. Id. Examples of such inaction
were given by the Court and include the following:
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Souter stated that, if an official with actual knowledge of a risk re-
sponds reasonably to that risk, he will not be liable for harm to prison-
ers, for prison personnel only have a duty to provide inmates with rea-
sonable safety."n
The Court rejected Farmer's contention that an inmate must first
suffer physical injury before he can seek injunctive relief from unconsti-
tutional conditions of confinement."' | Justice Souter explained that
when an inmate can present evidence of prison officials' knowing and
unreasonable disregard of a risk of harm that meets the objective com-
ponent of Wilson's two-part test,"n the court will grant injunctive relief
as long as the officials' disregard of the risk continues throughout the
litigation."3 Justice Souter warned that injunctive relief will only be
appropriate where inmates can establish a need for court interven-
tion."3 Inmates should first seek relief through the prison procedures
designed to address safety and health concerns." When an inmate has
[Where] a prison official is aware of a high probability of facts indicating
that one prisoner has planned an attack on another but resists opportunities
to obtain final confirmation; or when a prison official knows that some dis-
eases are communicable and that a single needle is being used to administer
flu shots to prisoners but refuses to listen to a subordinate who he strongly
suspects will attempt to explain the associated risk of transmitting disease.
Id.
130. Id. at 1983; see Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993) (recognizing
that the Eighth Amendment requires prisoners be provided with "reasonable safety");
see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990) (asserting that prison officials
have a "duty to take reasonable measures" to assure the safety of inmates); Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984) (stating that prison officials must take "reason-
able measures" to provide for inmates' safety).
131. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1983; see supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing HeUing and this very proposition).
132. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The objective component requires a
showing that there exists a sufficiently serious deprivation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 301 (1991).
133. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1983; see Helling, 113 S. Ct at 2481 (stating that courts
"need not await a tragic event" to remedy a substantial risk to inmate safety); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923) (noting that "[o]ne does not have
to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief'). In seek-
ing injunctive relief, an inmate may introduce, with the discretion of the court, events
or developments that have occurred after the filing of his complaint to establish the
ongoing nature of the deprivation. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1983. Likewise, the defen-
dants to such a suit may rely on the same to show that injunctive relief is no longer
necessary. Id.
134. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1984.
135. Id.
failed to do so, it is appropriate for a court to take this noncompliance
into account."
In applying this analysis to the facts before them, the majority decid-
ed to remand the case.'37 The Court found the record unclear as to
whether the district court may have concluded that prison officials had
no advance notice or knowledge of the danger to Farmer from the mere
fact that Farmer had never lodged a complaint."n Additionally, judg-
ment as a matter of law for Respondents was inappropriate because the
Court found items in the record that Farmer may argue on remand as
evidence of actual knowledge."n
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion,"' made it clear from
the beginning that a subjective component is misplaced in Eighth
Amendment analysis. He stated that prison conditions may be uncon-
stitutional irrespective of any subjective knowledge by prison offi-
cials.'' He announced unambiguously that Wilson does not follow
Court precedent regarding the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, and thus, the Court should overrule it."'
Justice Blackmun explained that because a prisoner is stripped of all
means of self-protection while incarcerated, the Constitution mandates
certain minimum levels of protection, treatment, and care.' These
136. Id. Relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, the Court stated that a district court may
compel an inmate to exhaust prison administrative procedures designed to address
such concerns before he may seek relief in a court of law. Id. Section 1997e pro-
vides that a court may "continue such case ... in order to require exhaustion of
such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available" at the facil-
ity where the inmate is incarcerated. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1988).
137. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1984.
138. Id. If this were the extent of the Court's reasoning, the decision would be
inconsistent with the Court's statement that an inmate need not show that he had
voiced concerns for his personal safety. See id. at 1983; see supra notes 123-25 and
accompanying text.
139. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1984. Evidence showed that the respondents acknowl-
edged that placing Farmer in the general prison population, considering his age and
feminine appearance, subjected him to danger. Id. at 1984-85. Also, the Court held
that the district court should reconsider Farmer's Rule 56(f) motion to determine
whether additional discovery should be allowed on the issue of actual knowledge. Id.
at 1985; see supra note 106.
140. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1986 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. Id. (Blackmnun, J., concurring). For a complete discussion of Wilson, see supra
notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
143. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1986 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun has
consistently pointed out the plight of prisoners in regard to the dangers of prison
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minimum levels include freedom from rape and violence at the hands of
other prisoners where reasonably possible.'" Justice Blackmun indi-
cated that the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman specifically recognized that
such acts of violence amount to punishment that serves no penological
purpose." These conditions would clearly be unconstitutional, as "all
punishment 'totally without penological justification'" is exactly what
the Eighth Amendment proscribes.'"
Justice Blackmnun further declared that over-crowding and under-
staffing due to budget problems do not excuse prison officials from
failing to provide prisoners with a safe environment.'47 He proclaimed
that the brutalities to which inmates subject each other are tantamount
to torture.'" He proclaimed that it is society's duty to protect prison-
life. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Blacummn, J., dissenting)
(stating that inmates must rely solely upon prison officials for protection); United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421-23 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that
society must provide inmates with safety from the atrocious conditions of America's
prisons).
144. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1986-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1987 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra notes 55-62 and accompany-
ing text for a complete discussion of Rhodes.
146. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1987 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
147. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun illustrated the torturous con-
ditions faced by inmates by citing the "horrors" documented in prior cases. Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring); see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1980)
(Blacknun, J., dissenting) ("A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homo-
sexual gang rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the van on the
way to jail .... Even more appalling is the fact that guards frequently participate in
the brutalization of inmates."); see also McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 346 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907 (1992); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942
F.2d 1435, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992). In
McGill, three inmates carrying homemade knives stood guard while another inmate
attacked the petitioner inmate while he was showering. McGiU, 944 F.2d at 346. The
attacker gagged him with his washcloth then raped him. Id. In Redman, the petition-
er was housed with an inmate who prison officials knew to be an aggressive homo-
sexual. Redman, 942 F.2d at 1438-39. The inmate raped the petitioner on the first
night they shared a cell. Id. The next day, the attacker raped the petitioner again,
joined this time by two additional inmates. Id. Justice Blackman recognized that
"[pirison rape not only threatens the lives of those who fall prey to their aggressors,
but is potentially devastating to the human spirit. Shame, depression, and a shattering
loss of self-esteem, accompany the perpetual terror the victim thereafter must en-
dure." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1987 (Blaclaun, J., concurring) (citing David M. Siegal,
Note, Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment Framework
of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L REv. 1541, 1545 (1992)).
ers from unsafe or unhealthy conditions, because by convicting and
incarcerating individuals, society has "tolled the bell" and made the
helpless prisoner the "collective responsibility" of the people.4 "
Justice Blackmun declared that the Court's analysis in this case and
in Wilson was "fundamentally misguided" to the point that it "defies
common sense."5 ° He expounded that the definition of punishment
includes any suffering or severe treatment that one receives regardless
of whether there is a "punisher" with the required culpable state of
mind.'' Moreover, the Court's narrow interpretation of what consti-
tutes punishment "blinds it to the reality of prison life."'54 Justice
Blackmun illustrated the difference in the punishment received by two
hypothetical inmates convicted of the same offense and sentenced for
the same period of time. He stated that when one of those inmates is
sentenced to a "relatively safe, well-managed prison, complete with
tennis courts and cable television, while the other is sentenced to a
prison characterized by rampant violence and terror[,]" their respective
punishments cannot be considered equal.5 Likewise, the Court's fo-
cus on the subjective knowledge and intent of a prison official is near-
sighted because it fails to recognize that just because the harm resulting
from one's punishment is not intended, it is "no less cruel or unusu-
al."1
54
Justice Blackmun provided additional support for his argument by
pointing to the Court's earlier decisions interpreting the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause. He focused on Rhodes v. Chapman, where
the Court specifically relied on an objective standard in determining
whether conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual pun-
149. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1987 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (internal quotations omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blaclnun, J., dissent-
ing)).
150. Id. at 1988 (Blaclnun, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1843 (3d ed. 1961)).
152. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
153. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun pointed to the intentions of
the framers of the Constitution for support. He stated that there is no indication that
they intended to proscribe only those cruel and unusual punishments that judges,
magistrates, or jailers intended to inflict. Id. (Blaclamun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun cited Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit as additional support for this
supposition: "'[The Framers] were also familiar with the cruelty that came from bu-
reaucratic indifference to the conditions of confinement... [and] understood that
cruel and unusual punishment can be administered by the failures of those in charge
to give heed to the impact of their actions on those within their care.'" Id,
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1544 (9th Cir.
1993) (Noonan, J., concurring)).
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ishment.In Justice Blackmun also referred to Whitley v. Albers, in
which the Court held that without penological purpose, harsh and inhu-
mane conditions of confinement are unconstitutional, even if there is no
"express intent to inflict unnecessary pain."'" Justice Blackmun ex-
plained that the objective approach the Court employed before Wilson
best served the principles expounded in the Constitution, for the Con-
stitution was not intended to shield prison officials from liability simply
because they lack mens rea 57
Justice Blacknun concluded his concurring opinion by reiterating his
belief that Wilson should be overruled." However, he joined in the
Court's opinion because the petitioner did not seek to have Wilson re-
considered.' 9 Additionally, Justice Blackmun recognized that the
majority's opinion did nothing to extend the holding of Wilson and
created no new obstacles for inmates challenging their conditions of
confinement."n Justice Blackmun took comfort in the fact that the ma-
jority recognized that prison officials are not free to tolerate inmate
assault and prisoners need not wait for harm to occur before they are
entitled to relief from unsafe conditions of confinement.' 6 Finally, he
concluded that the Court's opinion serves as notice to prison officials
that they must affirmatively act to provide to those within their care a
living environment that is free from sexual assault and other acts of
violence."n
155. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text
(discussing Rhodes).
156. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1988-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
157. Id. at 1989 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also pointed to Jas-
tice White's concurring opinion in Wilson, in which Justice Blackmun joined, as sup-
port for an objective approach to assessing conditions of confinement under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice White stated that "intent
simply is not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as
a prison system" since inhuman conditions of confinement are often the result of
"cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison,
sometimes over a long period of time." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 310 (1991)
(White, J., concurring).
158. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1989 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
160. Id. (Blaclnun, J., concurring).
161. Id. (Blackinun, J., concurring).
162. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
C. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens, in a surprisingly brief concurring opinion, stated that
while he joins Justice Souter's opinion because of its dedication to
precedent, he holds steadfast to the belief that prison conditions may
be unconstitutional regardless of any culpable state of mind on the part
of a prison official."n
D. Justice Thomas' Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas remained faithful to his
belief that it is only the sentence handed down by a judge or jury that
amounts to punishment." He proclaimed that "[c]onditions of confine-
ment are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless
imposed as part of a sentence. " " Justice Thomas characterized the
attack on the plaintiff as "unfortunate" but as it was not part of his sen-
tence, it was not "punishment" subject to scrutiny under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause." Justice Thomas noted that with its
current decision, the Court has once again refined what he referred to
as the "'National Code of Prison Regulation,' otherwise known as the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.""6 7 If the petitioner had pre-
sented the issue, Justice Thomas admitted that he would have cast his
vote in favor of overruling Estelle because the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause does not support including conditions of confinement
in the definition of punishment."
163. Id. at 1989-90 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens referred to his dissent-
ing opinion in EsteUe in which he indicated that the Court erred by including a refer-
ence to the subjective motivation of a person whose actions are being scrutinized
under the Eighth Amendment Id. (Stevens, J., concurring); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 109 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also cited Justice White's
concurring opinion in Wilson, in which Justice Stevens joined, stating that the condi-
tions of one's imprisonment are part of the punishment and prison officials should be
held liable without regard to their state of mind. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1989 (Stevens,
J., concurring); see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
164. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Helling, Justice Thomas
clarified his interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. "[T]he text and history of the
Eighth Amendment ... support the view that judges or juries-but not jailers--im-
pose 'punishment'" Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct 2475, 2484 (1993) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Additionally, Justice Thomas was explicit about his view of the Court's
decision in Estelle: "Were the issue squarely presented ... I might vote to overrule
Estelle." Id. at 2485 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
166. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id, (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct 995, 1010
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Eighth Amendment is not, and should not be
turned into, a National Code of Prison Regulation.").
168. Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas asserted
[Vol. 23: 175, 1995] Farmer v. Brennan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
However, Justice Thomas recognized that stare decisis requires him
to consider the deliberate indifference standard.' Upon looking at
Eighth Amendment precedent, he concluded that Farmer's proposed
"should have known" standard does not comport with Wilson's mandate
that mere negligence is not enough.7 ' Justice Thomas added that, be-
cause he believes the Court originally erred in its decision in Estelle,
Estelle and its progeny should receive the most narrow applicability.
17
Recognizing that the Court took "a step in the right direction" in this
case by narrowly construing Estelle and adopting the criminal reckless-
ness standard of actual knowledge, Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment while remaining hopeful that in the "proper case the Court
will reconsider Estelle in light of the constitutional text and history.""7
V. THE IMPLICATIONS
The Court set out in Farmer to eliminate the ambiguity created by
the deliberate indifference standard.' At first glance, the Court ap-
pears to have succeeded. Lower courts have responded quickly. 74
that by including conditions of confinement as a component of one's punishment to
be scrutinized under the Eighth Amendment, federal judges become the "superinten-
dents of prison conditions nationwide." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
stated that the Court, in recognizing the almost limitless liability this addition could
create for prison officials, added the state-of-mind requirement to curb the liability
that might otherwise be imposed. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 1990-91 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas recognized that "stare
decisis counsels hesitation in overruling dubious precedents." Id. at 1991.
170. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
172. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
173. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
174. See Farnsworth v. Coburn, No. 94-4193, 1995 WL 18282, at *1-2 (10th Cir. Jan.
18, 1995) (holding that under Farmer, county employees did not act with deliberate
indifference when they failed to protect an inmate from an assault by a fellow in-
mate, even though the victim had previously warned the staff of the attacker's violent
nature); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that repeated
acts of negligence by a prison doctor do not constitute deliberate indifference under
the Farmer standard); Clark v. Armontrout, 28 F.3d 71, 72 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing
and remanding because the district court did not adequately instruct as to Farmer's
subjective test of culpability); Medley v. Turner, No. 93-C-322, 1995 WL 23522, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 1995) (applying Farmer's subjective standard to a case involving
pretrial detainee's claim that prison officials used excessive force); Patterson v.
Walrath, No. CIV.A.94-2451, 1994 WL 328353, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 1994) (denying a
motion to dismiss because the correctional officer on duty at the time of the
prisoner's rape allowed the attacker unsupervised contact with the victim, even
Unfortunately, this is where the problems begin.
A. Is This Just Semantics?
1. The Court's Standard-Criminal Recklessness?
The majority made an unequivocal statement that only actual knowl-
edge on the part of prison officials constitutes deliberate indiffer-
ence. ' Justice Souter added that an inmate may prove the subjective
intent requirement by establishing that the risk of harm was obvi-
ous.17 In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals at-
tempted to explain this aspect of Farmer. In Farnsworth v. Coburn,'
a state prisoner brought an Eighth Amendment claim after he was at-
tacked by another inmate."8 The court of appeals held that the inmate
had not proved the recklessness required under the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard." The court explained that the deliberate indifference
standard, as set forth in Farmer, holds an official liable only if he has
subjective knowledge."s The opinion becomes muddled, however,
when the court adds that an "obvious risk is equivalent to the official
knowing of the risk."8' This language too closely resembles the civil
recklessness standard that Petitioner Farmer urged the Supreme Court
to adopt.'" Moreover, it fails to distinguish between obviousness as
circumstantial evidence and obviousness as a basis for imputing knowl-
edge.
2. The Civil Recklessness Standard
Farmer asked the Court to adopt a civil recklessness standard, which
would have held officials liable if they knew or should have known of a
though he knew the attacker to be dangerous); Redd v. Gilless, 857 F. Supp. 601
(W.D. Tenn. 1994) (finding that supervisory capacity is not enough to find deliberate
indifference under Farmer).
175. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); see supra notes 111-122 and
accompanying text.
176. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
177. Farnsworth, No. 94-4193, 1995 WL 18282, at *2.
178. Id. at *1. The inmate punched Farnsworth in the mouth and attempted to stab
him with a pencil. Id. Evidence showed that prior to this attack, Farnsworth told
prison officials that his attacker was violent and that he had threatened another
inmate's life. Id. A magistrate judge and a district court both dismissed Farnsworth's
complaint because he failed to allege facts evidencing deliberate indifference on the
part of the jail commander and the sheriff. Id. at *2.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (1994)).
182. See Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1979; see also supra note 117.
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substantial risk of harm to an inmate." To prove that an official
should have known of the risk, an inmate would point to the obvious-
ness of that risk, thus imputing knowledge." Prosser and Keeton rec-
ognize the most common meaning of recklessness as "an act of an un-
reasonable character [intentionally done] in disregard of a known or
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm
would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious
indifference to the consequences."" This sounds very similar to the
Court's language in Farmer. Justice Souter wrote that "the concept of
constructive knowledge is familiar enough that the term 'deliberate
indifference' would not, of its own force, preclude a scheme that con-
clusively presumed awareness from a risk's obviousness."" This is
not a complete rejection of Farmer's proposed civil recklessness stan-
dard. Moreover, this is inconsistent with the usual definition of criminal
recklessness.
The Model Penal Code defines criminal recklessness as actual aware-
ness of a risk of harm: "'A person acts recklessly.., when he con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk. . . ..,1 Within
this definition there is no mention of inferred knowledge due to the
obviousness of the risk of harm. The Court attempts to distinguish the
civil and criminal standards by explaining that under the criminal stan-
dard the obviousness of the risk is not dispositive of actual knowl-
edge.'" A prison official may prove that somehow the "obvious es-
caped him."" The Court seems to refuse to impute knowledge on the
part of prison officials even though a risk may be so blatantly obvious
that a reasonable person would be aware of it. Unfortunately, the Court
never makes this clear.
183. See Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1979.
184. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
185. W. PAGE KEETON UT AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRS § 34, at
213 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added). Prosser and Keeton also recognized that the
term "reckless" is often not clearly distinguishable from "gross negligence." Id. § 34,
at 214. This may be what the Supreme Court found troubling about adopting a civil
recklessness standard.
186. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1980 (emphasis added).
187. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRMINAL LAW § 3.7, at 237 n.24 (2d
ed. 1986) (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)).
188. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
189. Id. at 1982 n.8.
3. A Distinction Without a Difference?
How critical this distinction is remains to be seen. As noted earlier,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have taken from Farmer a
standard that will allow a prisoner to establish actual knowledge merely
by pointing to the obviousness of the risk."9 The court stated, "An ob-
vious risk is equivalent to the official knowing of the risk."' The ap-
pellate court seems to be applying a standard which allows courts to
impute knowledge. This is just what the Supreme Court was trying to
eliminate."
B. The Actual Knowledge Standard and Prisoner's Rights
Apart from possible continuing inconsistencies in applying the delib-
erate indifference standard, the Court's decision in Farmer presents
other problems. Although the Court claims that its decision follows
precedent, the Court does not properly account for its holding in Hutto
v. Finney," where it expressly recognized that conditions of confine-
ment are part of the punishment and thus are subject to scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment."9 In Farmer, Justice Souter stated that the
Eighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishment, not cruel and
unusual conditions, without mentioning this decision's effect on Hutto
and its progeny.9 ' Justice Souter justified this position by relying on
Wilson's holding that an Eighth Amendment violation is contingent
upon the existence of a wrongdoer with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.
Moreover, by holding steadfastly to Wilson's subjective requirement,
the Court condoned objectively inhumane conditions of confinement
According to Justice Souter, that a prison official "should have per-
ceived [a significant risk] but did not, while no cause for commenda-
tion, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punish-
190. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
191. Farnsworth v. Coburn, No. 94-4193, 1995 WL 18282, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seems to
be applying the intended interpretation. This court explained in a decision shortly
after Farmer that an inmate may establish that officials "must have known" of a risk
by showing the risk was 'longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly not-
ed by prison officials in the past." Stanback v. Fairman, No. 93 C 0816, 1994 WL
542781, at *3 (N.D. M. Oct. 3, 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Farmer, 114 S. Ct at 1981-82); see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text
193. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
194. Id. at 685; see supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing Hutto).
195. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994).
196. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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ment." 7 However, current standards of decency do not condone pris-
on officials' claims of ignorance about conditions that pose a threat to
the safety and well-being of inmates. A prison official is not just an
ordinary, reasonable person. A prison guard is exposed daily to the
special circumstances of a prison and the special needs of its inhabit-
ants, and thus develops an expertise that courts must recognize. In-
mates must rely on prison guards and officials for their most basic
needs, including safety from brutal physical assault and rape." An es-
sential purpose of prison guards is to maintain a safe, peaceful envi-
ronment by preventing inmate-on-inmate violence.
However, the actual knowledge requirement effectively places a duty
on inmates to insure their own safety.'" To invoke the Eighth Amend-
ment, an inmate must take affirmative steps to unequivocally and clear-
ly inform prison officials that a threat to his safety exists.' Young
prisoners incarcerated for the first time, however, may not be aware
that they are potential victims of physical and sexual assault by other
inmates.0 '
Maintaining a subjective intent requirement as strict as actual knowl-
edge effectively strips prisoners of the protection of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In the context of a prison, it is difficult to point to a particular
individual as a specific wrongdoer. A prison is an institution where the
fault for inhumane conditions may be spread over the entire administra-
tion.2" No single individual can be said to have caused the harm."
Justice Blackmun pointed out that although many prisons are faced
with overcrowding and understaffing, the Constitution must remain con-
stant.2" The minimum standards of decency required by the Constitu-
197. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1979.
198. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that prison officials control all aspects of prisoners' lives); see also
supra note 143.
199. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
200. See James v. Cooper, No. 91 C 7429, 1995 WL 35606, at *3 (N.D. III. Jan. 27,
1995). In James, the court stated that a "'prisoner normally proves actual knowledge
of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific
threat to his safety.'" Id. (quoting McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir.
1991)).
201. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 157.
203. See generaUy McGiU, 944 F.2d at 348-49 (stating that many items contribute to
dangerous prison conditions, including the number of guards present per inmate and
the design and size of the prison).
204. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1974, 1987 (1994) (Blackmaun, J., concurring).
tion cannot be subordinated to the states' concerns about the cost and
expense of remedying these conditions. Courts and judges "have no
duty more important than that of enforcing constitutional rights, no
matter how unpopular the cause or powerless the plaintiff.22  Holding
officials liable for conditions they should have known to be unconstitu-
tional would provide the spark necessary for the changes needed in
prisons across this country.20
6
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Farmer appears to be a straightforward decision
geared specifically toward eliminating the ambiguity in the application
of the deliberate indifference standard. With the Supreme Court's fail-
ure to specifically state that courts are not to impute knowledge from
obvious threats to inmates' safety, the success of the decision is ques-
tionable. However, one outcome of Farmer is clear. The protection
afforded by the Eighth Amendment is one step closer to being
surplanted by the decisions of state legislators and prison administra-
tors. By requiring actual knowledge on the part of an individual prison
official, the Court has narrowed the scope of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause's protection. This is contrary to prior interpreta-
tions by the Supreme Court, whereby the Court clearly intended that
the Clause expand and evolve as an instrument, reflecting societal
changes and enlightenment that inform standards of decency. 7 For
those in the underclass of prisoners, vulnerable to rape and assault,
Farmer makes the Eighth Amendment but a dim light of hope in seek-
ing relief from such wretched misery.
STACY LANCASTER COZAD
205. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1279 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 1995).
206. Cf. id. at *131 (finding constitutional violations in a newly built, but window-
less, facility where inmates were confined to small cells for over 22 hours a day,
guards used excessive force, and medical care was inadequate).
207. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
